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Abstract:	Ainslie	insightfully	refines	the	concept	of	willpower	by	emphasizing	low-
effort	applications	of	resolve.	However,	he	gives	undue	weight	to	intertemporal	
discounting	as	the	problem	that	willpower	is	needed	to	overcome.	Non-humans	
typically	don’t	encounter	choices	that	differ	only	in	the	time	of	consumption.	
Humans	learn	to	transform	uncertainty	into	problems	they	can	solve	using	
culturally	evolved	mechanisms	for	quantifying	risk.	
Ainslie’s	essay	displays	again	his	matchless	artistry	in	refining	our	conceptual	
resources	for	describing	ambivalent	choice	behavior.	Human	willpower,	as	he	
argues,	is	more	complex	than	metaphors	drawn	from	energetic	exertion	can	
capture.	In	its	most	reliable	applications	it	requires	little	effort	at	its	moments	of	
use.	I	once	had	to	deliberately	battle	with	myself	to	avoid	a	third	glass	of	wine	
before	bed	each	night.	Now	it’s	two	and	done	with	no	conscious	attention.	My	will	
rules	absolutely	and	serenely.	This	is	resolve,	paying	a	steady	dividend	stream	from	
an	investment	made	long	ago.	I	get	a	side	payment:	each	sip	of	wine	tastes	better	
when	there’s	no	ambivalence	about	its	goodness.	
Other	animals	don’t	seem	to	get	to	enjoy	such	triumphs.	As	Ainslie	points	out,	a	dog	
is	visibly	uncomfortable	while	waiting	to	be	allowed	to	eat	a	biscuit,	apparently	
losing	an	opportunity	to	enjoy	the	anticipation.	The	dog’s	willpower	seems	limited	
to	active	suppression	of	the	urge	to	disobey	her	owner,	and	active	suppression	is	
unpleasant.	Ainslie	argues	that	the	dog’s	foregone	consumption	utility	stems	from	a	
lack	of	foresight.	Human	achievement	of	this	capacity,	he	rightly	says,	is	among	the	
primary	bases	of	the	species’	ecological	dominance.	
This	is	deeply	insightful	and	persuasive.	What	is	less	so	is	Ainslie’s	explanation	of	it	
almost	entirely	in	terms	of	hypothesized	neural	implementation	of	hyperbolic	
intertemporal	discounting	of	reward	value,	to	which	the	dog	is	said	to	be	prisoner	
but	which	the	human	often	manages	to	work	around.	Ainslie	appeals	to	
neuroimaging	evidence	for	this	hypothesis.	But	the	evidence	in	question	comes	
heavily	pre-interpreted.	For	example,	Kable	&	Glimcher	(2007)	assume	that	the	
measurements	of	BOLD	differences	they	graph	hyperbolically	represent	
intertemporal	discounting.	That’s	fair	enough	in	context:	it’s	the	maintained	
hypothesis	of	a	rival	model	they	collected	their	data	to	test	and	then	criticize.	But	
the	signals	might	just	as	easily	be	related	to	preparation	for	reward	harvesting	
rather	than	to	utility	differences	associated	with	expected	time	of	consumption.	
Rats,	pigeons,	chimps,	and	bees	do	seem	to	discount	future	rewards	hyperbolically	if	
we	assume	that	their	choices	are	over	time-indexed	rewards.	But	these	behavioral	
patterns	can	equally	be	modeled	as	responses	to	uncertainty	more	generally.	Here	is	
food	the	bee	can	harvest	under	circumstances	where	she’s	detecting	no	signs	of	
danger.	Who	knows	when	she’ll	next	be	so	lucky?	The	patch	over	the	hill	might	be	a	
richer	source,	which	she	could	exploit	only	if	she’s	patient	and	doesn’t	fill	her	pollen	
sacks	right	here.	But	the	probability	of	a	predatory	wasp	being	there	is	higher	than	
the	probability	of	a	wasp	here,	simply	because	she	doesn’t	see	one	now.			
Humans	arguably	have	technologies	that	most	animals	lack	for	turning	uncertainty	
into	(roughly)	quantified	risk.	The	technologies	in	question	are	probably	culturally	
evolved,	rather	than	based	on	novel	adaptations	that	could	be	measured	in	
functional	neural	architecture.	Humans	divide	labour	and	distribute	roles	based	on	
explicit	rules	and	normative	principles	that	they	encode	in	shared	stories,	or,	lately	
and	more	reliably,	in	written	regulations	and	numerical	algorithms.	Then,	as	Ainslie	
has	emphasized	for	years,	they	can	apply	this	governance	by	regulations	to	
themselves.	A	person	can	explicitly	insert	herself	into	the	virtual	role	of	a	boss	or	
influential	peer,	and	give	herself	orders.	As	Ainslie	has	also	stressed	insightfully,	she	
can	even	construct	a	virtual	tyrant	over	herself,	against	whom	she	looks	for	
loopholes	and	might	stage	a	disruptive	revolt.		
Of	course	animals,	including	humans,	must	pay	attention	to	time.	A	songbird	in	a	
high	latitude	can	in	summer	wait	to	venture	out	to	forage	until	all	owls	have	surely	
retired,	but	risks	starving	if	she	is	equally	patient	for	sunrise	in	mid-winter.	But	it	
isn’t	clear	that	she	should,	or	does,	represent	this	by	computing	an	intertemporal	
discount	function.	She	tolerates	higher	risk	of	predation	in	January	than	in	July	
because	burning	energy	while	hiding	in	the	bush	is	also	risky.	The	mere	prospect	of	
time	ahead	is	a	source	of	risk,	because	intervals	always	include	events,	and	event	
probabilities	get	harder	to	estimate	as	their	interactions	over	time	accumulate	and	
must	be	multiplied.	
Ainslie	may	be	encouraged	to	take	future	time	preference	as	a	primitive	instead	of	
one	of	many	arguments	in	a	risk	function	because	his	favored	metaphor	for	
behavioral	control	at	the	scale	of	the	whole	organism	is	a	marketplace.	He	
understands	interests	in	different	consumption	prospects	as	bidding	against	one	
another	in	a	common	currency.	Then	the	only	evident	factor	that	could	possibly	
make	2	seed	pellets	now	preferable	to	4	seed	pellets	in	2	hours	is	the	difference	
between	now	and	later.	Humans	deliberately	create	choices	like	this	for	themselves,	
because	doing	so	turns	uncertainty	into	risk	and	allows	us	to	apply	powerful	tools	
we’ve	collectively	developed,	mathematics	and	statistics.	This	is	how	humans	pull	
off	most	of	their	highly	distinctive	feats:	by	actively	transforming	decision	problems	
into	terms	for	which	their	social	environments	provide	solution	rules.	Most	animals	
in	the	wild	–	though	elephants,	dolphins,	corvids,	and	parrots	might	be	exceptions	–	
simply	don’t	encounter	option	sets	that	differ	only	or	mainly	in	time	of	consumption.	
In	the	lab	we	can	try	to	force	them	to	reckon	with	such	problems,	but	it’s	difficult	to	
fully	succeed.	The	mouse	who	stays	close	to	the	wall	of	her	cage	evidently	isn’t	
getting	the	message	that	her	predation	risk	is	zero.	And,	in	any	event,	she	can’t	
imagine	a	more	authoritative	mouse	telling	her	to	let	rationality	override	her	fear.	
The	internal	marketplace	metaphor	certainly	has	its	uses.	A	brain	doing	a	job	must	
allow	itself	to	be	distracted	by	new	opportunities,	but	not	too	easily.	And	this	
requires	that	alternative	objects	of	attention	be	comparatively	valued	in	real	time.	
Expected	consumption	time	of	rewards	is	a	recurrently	important	variable,	and	one	
that	we	know	is	estimated	by	dopamine	signals.	But	real	markets,	unless	they	
involve	only	very	simple	informational	dynamics,	are	highly	volatile	and	inefficient	
unless	they	are	well	regulated.	Resolve	as	Ainslie	characterizes	it	requires	good	
government.	
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